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I. INTRODUCTION
Managed health care systems have been created as an alternative to the
fee-for-service method of providing health care. 1 The prototypical example of
a managed health care system is the health maintenance organization (HMO).
An HMO is a public or private, state-licensed entity organized to provide basic
and supplemental health care services to its members via a prepaid financing
program.2 Accordingly, a multitude of health services are provided to members
who pay a fixed rate regardless of the frequency, extent, or kind of health care
provided.3
In our society, where affordable and accessible health care is one of the
foremost national concerns, the HMO is consistently viewed as a viable answer
1Under a "fee-for-service" health care system, individuals are charged a fee each
time they receive medical services. This charge is made for each service rendered, and
its amount is usually based on the type of service rendered. To avoid the risk of having
to pay a large health care bill following medical treatment, many individuals in our
country obtain health care insurance. Under such a system, when medical services are
rendered, the insurance company will pay all or a portion of such charges.
2See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(a) (1988).
342 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1) (1988).
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to our health care troubles. 4 In fact, both political parties have advocated the
proliferation and utilization of HMOs in the parties' national health care
policies.5
As HMOs grow in size and number, so will questions of their operation and
treatment under the law, particularly with respect to their treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code). Like many hospitals, some HMOs are
organized and operated as nonprofit entities and seek tax exemption under
§ 501 of the Code.6 Those HMOs that are exempt under § 501(c)(3) qualify as
charitable organizations, and those exempt under § 501(c)(4) qualify as social
welfare organizations. Both § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations are
exempt from federal income taxation, but qualification as a § 501(c)(3)
organization carries with it many other benefits that make qualification under
this provision very desirable.
Since the beginning of the comprehensive federal income tax, many
hospitals have enjoyed an exemption from federal taxation as charitable
organizations. 7 Although the role of the hospital has evolved over the past
century, many hospitals still qualify under § 501(c)(3) as charitable
organizations and rely on their tax-exempt status to provide quality health
care.8 This exemption saved hospitals, as a whole, approximately $1.5 billion
in federal taxes during fiscal year 1992.9
HMOs and hospitals are similar institutions in that they are health care
organizations. There are, however, vast differences between hospitals and
HMOs, including differences in the way the institutions are organized and
differences in the basic services that the institutions provide. Nonetheless, the
Internal Revenue Service (the Service), the courts, and Congress have
4 But see, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Rethinking the Health Care Delivery Crisis: The Need for
a Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 49 (1992-93)(pointing out that HMOs are
also subject to the inflationary problems that have plagued the pay-for-service system
supplemented with insurance and Medicare, due to the fact that there are no marginal
costs to the consumer, thereby prompting an "all you can eat" approach by the consumer
to care from an HMO).
5 See generally RobertPear, Bush at Odds with IRS over Treatment of HMOs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1992, at 28; Clinton Administration's proposed Health Security Act, HR. 3600,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6 See I.R.C. § 501 (1995).
7 BRUCE R. HoPKINs, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 37 (5th ed. 1987).
8 See generally Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3600
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11470 (1993) (statement
of Marc Wolfert, V.P. of Government Assisted Programs for the Health Insurance Plan
of Greater New York); I.R.S. Exempt. Rul. 93-12011 (Nov. 17,1993).
9See generally Tax Treatment of Health Care Organizations, 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3600
Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
103rd Cong., 1stSess. 12803 (1993) [hereinafterTax Treatment underH.R. 3600] (statement
of RobertS. McIntyre, Director, Citizens for Tax Justice)(citing testimony by the Treasury
Department in 1991).
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continued to compare and analogize HMOs to hospitals when deciding the
tax-exempt status of HMOs. As a result, some HMOs have been precluded from
tax exemption based on dissimilarities between their operation and structure
and the operation and structure of hospitals.10
The question of tax exemption for HMOs is further complicated because
HMOs offer, as part of their services, a form of health care financing. Some have
argued that HMOs are simply health insurance companies."1 The 1986
amendments to the Code revoked any tax exemptions given to commercial
insurance companies, 12 and therefore, classification as a commercial insurance
company would be detrimental to an HMO seeking tax exemption.' 3 Congress,
however, exempted from this revocation "incidental health insurance provided
by a health maintenance organization of a kind customarily provided by such
organizations." 14 The Service currently interprets this rule of law favorably for
most HMOs with regard to classification as commercial insurers.15
Nevertheless, the fact that members of an HMO assure themselves health care
based on prepaid fees to the HMO represents a function that is arguably a type
of insurance.16 This fact, coupled with the fact that HMOs are not per se
hospitals, has undermined attempts by HMOs to attain tax-exempt status.
1 0 HMOs across the country are organized and operated in a number of ways. For
example, a "staff model" HMO operates a full-scale medical facility and hires physicians
and support staff as employees of the HMO, compensating these employees based on
some type of fixed salary. "Group model" HMOs usually operate a full-scale medical
facility but contract with existing groups of physicians and support staffs to provide
care at the HMO. The care providers are usually contracted based on a fixed
compensation that is normally a function of the number of members in the HMO.
Individual Practice Association (IPA) HMOs may or may not operate a medical facility
and, if no medical facility is owned, contract with local hospitals to provide such
facilities. Care in this style of HMO is provided by physicians who are part of an
individual practice association operating out of their own offices. Similarly, "network
model" HMOs contract with medical groups, private physicians and hospitals to
provide care to their members. Finally, HMOs can be, and usually are, organized and
operated by employing a combination of the above characteristics. See Kenneth L.
Levine, Geisinger Health Plan Likely to Adversely Affect HMOs and Other Health
Organizations, 79 J.TAx'N 90, 91 n. 6 (1993).
1 1 See Testimony of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association on Tax Provisions in the Health
Security Act, 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3600 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 12808 (1993)(statement of
Mary Nell Lehnhard, Senior Vice President, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association)
[hereinafter Testimony of Blue Cross Blue Shield]; see also Philip S. Neal & Suzanne M.
Papiewski, Taxation of HMOs Now and Under Health Care Reform-Separating Fact From
Fiction, 9 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 577 (1994).
1 2 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
1 3 See I.R.C. § 501(m) (1995).
14 I.R.C. § 501(m)(3)(B) (1995).
15 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10,1990).
1 6 See Testimony of Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Given the similarities between HMOs and both hospitals and insurance
companies, the standards that have developed around hospitals and insurance
companies are relevant to the issue of tax exemption for HMOs. These
standards, however, are not always appropriate. Bottom line, the unanswered
question is the policy issue of whether health care management companies
should be tax-exempt.
The Service has been willing to grant tax exemptions only to select HMOs
meeting specific organizational and operational criteria.17 The Service
approaches the question of tax exemption for HMOs on a case-by-case basis
under a two-tiered analysis.18 First, the Service looks to whether an HMO is
providing substantially health care services or insurance services.19 If the HMO
is deemed to be providing substantially an insurance service, it will not be
granted any tax exemption.20 Second, if the HMO is providing substantially
health care services, then the examination moves to the second tier, and the
question of tax exemption will be decided in accord with the standards
developed for hospitals.21 Those HMOs meeting the qualifying criteria
adopted for hospitals will qualify as charitable organizations and gain
exemption under § 501(c)(3).22 Those HMOs that do not meet the standards for
exemption that have been adopted for hospitals will be precluded from
charitable status and will have to rely on gaining exemption as social welfare
organizations pursuant to § 501(c)(4).23
Although judicial review of the Service's position on this matter is sparse, a
1993 Third Circuit opinion has affirmed the Service's philosophy regarding
§ 501(c)(3) charitable status.24 Furthermore, recent health care proposals have
adopted the Service's current philosophy regarding exemption of HMOs. 25
Some commentators have suggested that the current approach regarding tax
exemption to HMOs is too limited, precluding worthy institutions of
17 See generally Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
18 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10, 1990).
191d.
20Id.
21id.
22See Harry G. Gourevitch, Tax Aspects of Health Care Reform: The Tax Treatment of
Health Care Providers, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 1317, 1319 (1994).
23Id.
24Geisinger, 985 F.2d 1210.
25See Clinton Administration's proposed Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd
Cong., 1stSess. (1993);seealso Description and Analysis of Provisions in the Health Security
Act (H.R. 3600) Relating to the Tax Treatment of Organizations Providing Health Care Services
and Related Organizations, 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3600 Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 12785
(1993) [hereinafter Health Security Act Description] (prepared by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation).
[Vol. 9:187
1994-95] TAX EXEMPTION TO HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 191
exemption, especially as charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3). 26 These
commentators suggest that tax exemption is an essential option to those in the
health care industry and limiting this option to HMOs will inhibit the growth
of nonprofit HMOs and, likewise, inhibit their role in our nation's health care
reform.27 Others, especially those in the health insurance business, have argued
that health care institutions should not be exempt, especially HMOs.28 Their
arguments are grounded on the theory that HMOs are simply health care
insurers and tax exemption to such organizations creates an uneven playing
field, treating similarly situated taxpayers differently.29
In light of the expected role HMOs will play in this country's health care
reform, the continued debate over the Service's position regarding tax
exemption for HMOs, the recent judicial confirmation of the Service's position,
and proposals to codify the requirements a tax-exempt HMO must meet, a
closer look at HMOs and the questions involving iheir tax exemption is
warranted. Specifically, this note will examine the criteria that hospitals must
meet to attain tax-exempt status and will consider the appropriateness of these
criteria with respect to HMOs. This will entail a closer look at the Service's
current position with respect to HMOs and the case law that has evolved in the
hospital and HMO area. Also, this note will examine the law defining insurance
providers and consider the arguments that have and will be asserted regarding
whether HMOs are simply insurance companies. Finally, this note will
conclude with the suggestion that the question of tax exemption for HMOs is
purely a policy question that should be viewed apart from hospitals and
insurance companies, whereby Congress should simply consider whether
tax-exempt managed health care companies are beneficial to our health care
system.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
Section 501(a) of the Code offers complete forgiveness30 from federal
taxation to any of more than twenty categories of organizations. 31 For example,
§ 501(c)(3) offers tax forgiveness to those organizations which qualify as
"charitable."32 Beyond this federal tax forgiveness, however, those organiza-
2 6 See Levine, supra note 10, at 98.
2 71d.
2 8 See Testimony of Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra note 11.
2 9 See Neal & Papiewski, supra note 11, at 587.
3 0Although an organization may be exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501(a)
(1995), there is still a tax levied on income that is earned as a result of an unrelated
business activity. See IR.C. § 501(b) (1995); see generally I.R.C. §§ 510-514 (1995).
3 1See I.R.C. § 501 (1995).
3 21R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1995).
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tions qualifying as "charitable" organizations reap other tax benefits not spelled
out under § 501.33
For example, organizations meeting the "charitable" requirements of
§ 501(c)(3) are also eligible to receive charitable contributions from individual
taxpayers under § 170.34 Accordingly, taxpayers who contribute to such
charitable organizations may deduct their contributions as allowed pursuant
to § 170. Furthermore, organizations qualifying under § 501(c)(3) can benefit
from tax-exempt financing by issuing tax-exempt bonds in conjunction with a
state or local municipality pursuant to § 103 of the Code.35 With this advantage,
such "charitable" organizations can quickly finance expansion and upkeep
expenses through bond financing at a lower rate of interest than they could
otherwise obtain in the market.36 Finally, many states offer freedom from state
and local income taxes to those organizations qualifying as "charitable" under
§ 501(c)(3).37 Therefore, although § 501(c) offers freedom from federal taxes to
a variety of organizations, qualification as a § 501(c)(3) organization is by far
the most desirable.
Section 501(c)(4) organizations receive the same forgiveness from federal
income taxation under § 501(a) as charitable organizations. 38 They cannot,
however, benefit from tax-exempt bond financing, receive tax-exempt
contributions and often do not receive favorable treatment regarding state and
local taxes.39
III. THE HISTORY OF TAX EXEMPTION FOR HOSPITALS
As the reality of federal income taxation took on full steam in the early
twentieth century and was finally ratified by the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,
Congress saw the need to exempt certain organizations from income taxation.4 0
Some commentators have suggested that these exemptions derived from a
33 See generally Health Security Act Description, supra note 25.
34 See I.R.C. § 170 (1995).
35 See I.R.C. § 103(a), (b) (1995); see also I.R.C. §§ 141-45 (1995).
36 Because interest received on bonds satisfying the requirements of § 103 is tax-free
to the recipient, such bonds can be offered at a significantly lower rate of interest (a rate
equal to the after-tax rate of interest on equivalent taxable bonds). Thus, § 103 allows
states and municipalities (and certain private entities borrowing through states and
municipalities, such as hospitals) to finance their activities at a lower cost.
37But see, e.g., Utah v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (1985)(holding
that tax exemption given to hospitals is inconsistent with the Constitution of the State
of Utah, thereby revoking any state and local tax exemptions provided to hospitals
under state statutes and ordinances).
381.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1995).
39See Gourevitch, supra note 22, at 1320.
40See James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAx LAW. 523,
524-27 (1976).
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simple sense of heritage or morality.41 Others believe tax exemptions were
obtained by the persistence and convincing arguments of special interest
groups contending that their organizations were not appropriate candidates
for taxation.42 Others have posited economic arguments for federal tax
exemptions, reasoning that if it were not for tax-exempt organizations, the
government would have to expend revenue dollars to provide the benefit to
the public that the tax-exempt institutions provide.43
Today, § 501 of the Code exempts from taxation a variety of organizations
ranging from cemetery companies to horticultural organizations. 44
Specifically, § 501(c)(3) of the Code exempts "corporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes
.. or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."45
Hospitals traditionally have been included in the group of charitable
organizations escaping federal taxation.46 Historically, charities have been
organizations that cared for the poor, homeless, or sick in our society. In fact,
the word "charity" generally is associated with generosity and benevolence to
the poor and needy. Consistent with this understanding of the word charity,
nineteenth century and early twentieth century hospitals were often
sanctuaries for the poor and sick who could not financially afford a doctor to
care for them in their home.47 A majority, if not all, of these early hospitals
survived financially on income obtained from charitable donations.48
With advancements in medicine and medical techniques during the
twentieth century came dramatic changes in the role hospitals played in
providing health care.49 Instead of social welfare institutions, hospitals quickly
became large enterprises closely linked with advanced and expensive medical
treatment.50 As a result, the hospital became the primary location to which the
entire community turned for health treatment-rich and poor alike.51
41 d. at 525-26.
42 1d. at 527.
43 See HOPKINs, supra note 7, at 37.
44 See generally, LR.C. § 501 (1995).
45 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1995).
46 See Utah, 709 P.2d at 270.
471d.
481d.
491d.
50709 P.2d at 270.
51See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158 (1978); Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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This metamorphosis in the structure and function of hospitals invited the
Service to rethink the tax-exempt status of hospitals. In 1956, the Service issued
Revenue Ruling 56-185 (1956 Revenue Ruling),52 which set forth four
conditions a hospital must meet in order to qualify for tax exemption as a
charitable organization. First, a hospital must be organized as a "not-for-profit
entity"53 whose primary goal is to care for the sick.54 Second, and most
significantly, the hospital must be operated, to the extent of its financial ability,
for those not able to pay for its services.55 Third, the hospital must not restrict
use of its facilities to a particular group of physicians.56 Finally, as is specified
in the Code, the earnings of a hospital must not inure, directly or indirectly, to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.57
In 1959, however, the Service issued Treasury Regulations laying the
groundwork for a much broader interpretation of tax-exempt hospitals.
According to these regulations: "[tihe term "charitable" is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be
construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other
tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as
developed by judicial decisions."58 In other words, the fact that hospitals are
not specifically listed in § 501, does not preclude their exemption from federal
income tax.
The promulgation of this regulation provoked Revenue Ruling 69-545 in
1969 (1969 Revenue Ruling)59 whereby the Service discussed the issue of
tax-exempt hospitals by way of publishing anonymously the results of two
earlier Private Letter Rulings. Each Private Letter Ruling was directed to the
52Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956 C.B. 203-04.
53A common misunderstanding of the not-for-profit status is the notion that the
organization should not make a profit. The crux of the status, however, depends upon
where the profits go if in fact they are made. The profits of a tax-exempt entity cannot
inure to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals as defined in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(a)-I, and in most cases the profits are directed back into the organization to
further its purpose. In fact, there are strong policy reasons why not-for-profit institutions
should be operated to make a profit. Profitable institutions are often marked with
quality, efficiency, and sound management. Thus, if a not-for-profit institution is
providing a service that the government would have to provide but for the institution,
then quality, efficiency and sound management are desirable. Moreover, if the profits
and earnings of a not-for-profit institution are funnelled back into the institution, the
exempt purpose is directly furthered, eliminating the transfer of funds to Washington
and back to the institution via subsidy.
54 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956 C.B. 203.
55Id.
56Id.
571d.
58Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
59See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
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tax-exempt status of a separate hospital.60 Notably, one of the hospitals failed
to render services, to the extent of its financial ability, to those unable to pay
for such services.61 The only "charitable" service the hospital provided was
full-time emergency care to those in the community, regardless of their ability
to pay.62 Admission to the hospital, however, was predicated on one's ability
to pay, via insurance or some public program such as Medicare. 63 Nevertheless,
the Service ruled that this hospital qualified as a tax-exempt entity under § 501.
The Service justified its apparent turnabout by declaring that the term
"charitable" could be extended to mean the general promotion of health of a
community.64 In so doing, the Service looked to the fact that the hospital
provided emergency service to the entire community, and that the hospital
admitted a sufficiently large number of people into the hospital, even though
this group was limited to those who could pay.65
Following the promulgation of the 1969 Revenue Ruling, various health and
welfare organizations and several private citizens brought suit against the
Service challenging the validity of the 1969 Revenue Ruling.66 In Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon,67 the D.C. Circuit overturned a district
court's ruling and upheld the Service's decision to grant a tax exemption even
if the requirements of the 1956 Revenue Ruling had not been met, especially
where the hospital in question was analogous to the hospitals described in the
1969 Revenue Ruling. The court initially reasoned that, since the Code does not
specifically define what is meant by "charitable," the meaning was subject to
interpretation. 68 Given the various interpretations given to the term
"charitable," especially in areas of the common law, the court ruled that the
601d. at 117-19.
61Id.
621d. at 117.
63Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
6 4 Relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 368 and 372, and IV SCOTT
ON TRUSTS (3d ed. 1967) §§ 368 and 372.2, the Service concluded
[t]he promotion of health... is one of the purposes in the general law
of charity that is deemed beneficial to the community as a whole even
though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct benefit from its
activities does not include all members of the community, such as indigent
members of the community....
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. at 118.
65 /d.
66 Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (1973), rev'd sub
nom. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
67506 F.2d 1278.
681d. at 1280-81.
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term "charitable" could be interpreted as meaning more than the "relief of the
poor."69 With this understanding, the court upheld the Service's ruling that the
"promotion of health is a charitable purpose."70 The court reasoned that
changes in the area of health care prompted a more expansive view of the
"charitable" status of hospitals that did not focus merely on the care a hospital
provides to the poor.
Furthermore, the court considered the fact that the Code was amended in
1969, and that Congress, aware of the 1969 Revenue Ruling, failed to amend
the Code to disallow such an interpretation of the term "charitable."71 In fact,
Congress contemplated a provision that would have provided a blanket tax
exemption to all institutions "organized and operated exclusively for the
providing of hospital care."72
Regardless of the broad interpretation that this court seemed to give to the
word "charitable," and the broad discretion it seemed to bestow on the Service
in determining which hospitals qualify for tax exemption, the court clearly
relied on the requirement that a hospital provide at least emergency care to the
indigent.73 Thus, some believed that the operation of an emergency room open
to the entire community was essential to attaining tax exemption. In 1983,
however, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 83-157 (1983 Revenue Ruling),74
concluding that the operation of an emergency room is not a requirement that
need be met to qualify for tax exemption, at least where such services would
be duplicative within the community.75
Although the issue of whether hospitals should be exempt is not an issue
specifically addressed by this note, considering those essential characteristics
of a hospital that yield tax exemption is valuable when considering the issue
of exemption for HMOs. Particularly, the 1983 Revenue Ruling, concluding that
emergency room services are not mandatory where duplicative within a
community, serves to better delineate the essence of the hospital exemption.
Prior to this ruling, many believed that the determining factor that gave rise to
a hospital's tax exemption was the free care offered through its emergency
room.76 With the promulgation of the 1983 Revenue Ruling, however, a
question still remains: What is the essential characteristic supporting tax
691d. at 1287-88.
70 Id. at 1287-90.
71506 F.2d at 1288-90.
72 Id. at 1289.
731d. at 1289-90 (concluding that Revenue Ruling 69-545 did not overrule Revenue
Ruling 56-185 but modified Revenue Ruling 56-185 by offering hospitals an alternative
means to provide care to the indigent via an emergency room).
74 Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
751d. at 94-95.
7 6 See Eastern Kentucky, 506 F.2d at 1289 (stating that, "to qualify as a tax exempt
charitable organization, a hospital must still provide services to indigents").
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exemption?77 Obviously it is not the care of the poor or any type of free services
rendered. Moreover, even in the case of a hospital that provides free emergency
room care, what is the justification for allowing an exclusion of income related
to the hospital's major source of revenue, its non-emergency services?
A possible answer to these questions could simply be the fact that a hospital
is promoting the health of a community, and this function furthers a charitable
purpose.78 This, however, cannot be the only criterion since "promotion of
health" as a charitable purpose expands the field of eligible organizations too
broadly; for example, a health club could be tax-exempt since it arguably
promotes the health of the community.
A more consistent approach would suggest that the determining factor
giving rise to the hospital exemption is the provision of health care.79 Thus, an
institution organized as a not-for-profit organization providing health care
services should arguably be entitled to tax-exempt status. In other words, the
act of providing health care gives rise to the tax exemption. The absence of an
emergency room, on the other hand, appears to preclude tax exemption only
in certain situations. An analogy can be drawn to educational institutions,
which are specifically exempt under § 501(c)(3). The act of educating is the
determinative element that yields the tax exemption, while operating under a
discriminatory policy can serve to frustrate the tax exemption.80 Similarly, the
act of providing health care to patients appears to be the determinative factor
that gives rise to the tax exemption. 81
Policy reasons also support this conclusion. A significant reason supporting
tax exemption was the underlying economic motivation, whereby, the
government would have to perform the service if it were not for the exempt
7 7 Allowing tax exemption to institutions not having an emergency room "will further
the public's interest because the emergency care offered by a health care provider that
is not a hospital usually cannot compare to the emergency care offered by hospitals."
Levine, supra note 10, at 93.
78 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The promotion of health within a
community has long been recognized as a charitable purpose.
79Health care is used here narrowly to refer to a broad range of "hands-on" health
care services provided to patients by health care professionals. It is not used to refer to
the "arranging of" doctor care, or the like, which arguably is a health care service. For
example, a physical given by a doctor is a health care service, but the arranging for the
physical and the payment for that physical is not a health care service for purposes of
this argument.
80 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)(holding that a
discriminatory admissions policy precludes tax exemption for an institution otherwise
worthy of tax exemption as an educational institution).
81Educational institutions are specifically listed in § 501 of the Code, while hospitals
are not. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1995). As in the case of hospitals, however, the element of
charity is not the determinative factor giving rise to the tax-exempt status. The element
of education appears to be the determinative factor, above and beyond any form of
traditional charity. Likewise, a hospital's exemption should be based on the promotion
of the health of the community rather than providing alms and the like to the poor.
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organization. Because health care is one of the foremost national concerns,
government would be called upon to provide health care absent a private
industry. Therefore, a sound argument can be made that dollars earned by
organizations providing health care should not be taxed. This would allow
profits generated from these tax-exempt organizations to circulate directly back
into the organization for the benefit of the organization. The organization is
then in a better position to benefit the community by the fact that market
pressures and bottom-line profits will be less of a concern, thereby allowing
health care or health care management to be the primary concern.82 This back
door subsidy, as some commentators have defined it, eliminates the money
transfer through Washington and any red tape associated with such transfer.83
IV. HMOs: HEALTH CARE PROVIDER OR INSURANCE COMPANY?
Section 501(m) of the Code, promulgated as a part of the 1986 amendments
to the Code,84 repealed all tax exemptions for "certain organizations providing
commercial-type insurance."85 Exempted, however, from the definition of
"commercial-type insurance" is incidental insurance customarily provided by
health maintenance organizations.86 Although this exemption appears to
protect HIOs from the § 501(m) tax exemption repeal, the fact that Congress
did not define such words as "incidental" and "customarily" leaves many
HMOs at the mercy of the Service's discretion. The problem is further
exacerbated because the Code does not affirmatively define "commercial-type
insurance."87
The House Report regarding these amendments indicates that the House
intended to safeguard all HMOs that provide health care to their members via
staff physicians practicing at a facility owned and operated by the HMO, that
is, a staff model HMO.88 Although the Senate did not confront these questions,
the Statement of Managers suggests that a very broad definition of HMO was
agreed upon, one that also includes group model and IPA model HMOs.89
82 See Robert A. Boisture, Maintaining a Strong Nonprofit Health Care System Will Be
More-Not Less-Important After Health Care Reform, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 785, 786
(1994).
83 See HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 49.
84 See The Tax Reform Act of 1986.
85See I.R.C. § 501(m) (1995).
861.R.C. § 501(m)(3)(B) (1995).
87 Section 501(m)(3) states what "commercial-type insurance" shall not include, but
fails to state what "commercial-type insurance" shall include.
88 See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 665 (1985); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828
(Sept. 10,1990). See generally supra note 10 (defining the various organizational formats
of HMOs).
89 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-346 (1986) (from the Statement
of Managers of the House Conference Report).
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Nevertheless, the issue remains ambiguous and ultimately rests with the
Service's discretion and judicial review thereof.
The Service's position on the matter can be gleaned from a 1990 IRS General
Counsel Memorandum,90 which sets forth the applicable test for examining
the tax status of HMOs. Because Congress did not affirmatively define
"commercial-type insurance," the Service chose to focus on the "common
meaning of the term."91 Turning to the common law, the Service pointed out
basic elements that define insurance, including risk shifting, risk distribution,
and the realization of adverse results on the insurer if the risk becomes payable;
that is, the insured collects on the policy as a result of a certain occurrence. 92
The Service's approach has resulted in favorable tax exemptions to staff
model HMOs. 93 The Service has reasoned that the service aspect of staff model
HMOs overshadows the insurance attributes of the HMO, thereby qualifying
the organization for tax exemption. 94 Nevertheless, the Service has indicated
that whether an HMO does or does not own a medical facility or directly
employs a group of physicians is not determinative of its status as either a
health provider or insurer.95 Instead, the Service has determined that the most
important characteristic is risk control. 96 If an HMO can control its risk, it will
90 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10,1990).
911d. (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,211 (1978)).
921d. (citing Helvering v. LeGierae, 312 U.S. 531 (1941)).
9 31d.
94Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10,1990).
951d.
961d. The Service relied on the definition of insurance set forth in Allied Fidelity Corp.
v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978). In Allied, the court stated that "insurance
is an agreement to protect the insured against a direct or indirect economic loss arising
from a defined contingency whereby the insurer undertakes no present duty of
performance but stands ready to assume the financial burden of any covered loss." Id.
(citing 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d 1:2 (1959)). Because the insurer will "assume the
financial burden of any covered loss," the insurer is accepting a risk as to whether the
insured-against event or "defined contingency" will occur. An insurance company or
insurer can control this risk in several ways. One way is to control the contingency. This
is rarely an option since insured contingencies are often not controllable. For example,
an insurer can have little control over whether someone becomes ill, or over the gravity
of someone's illness. Another way an insurer can control risk is by placing the risk on
another party. For example, an insurer can contract with a group of doctors to care for
the primary needs of a group of people. This contract would be for a fixed or lump-sum
amount of money. The risk then shifts from the insurer to the group of doctors. The
doctors accept the risk speculating that the cost of primary care for the designated
insured group is equal to or below the lump-sum payment received. In gambling terms,
if the group is healthier than average, the doctors win. If the group needs more service
than expected, the doctors lose.
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be deemed to be a health care provider rather than insurance provider. If the
HMO has little control over its risk, it will be deemed a health care insurer.97
HMOs gain or lose control of risk based on the nature of their contracts with
both hospital facilities and health care providers. Those HMOs that are able to
"capitate"---or fix-physician expenses, will exercise a degree of control over
their risk and most likely will not be deemed an insurer.98 For example, an
HMO that controls its risk, or actually has no risk, would operate under a
system whereby the HMO contracts with a group of physicians and pays these
physicians a fixed amount of money or places a ceiling on the amount of money
paid to such physicians. The risk is then placed on the physicians who may
have to provide services worth more than the lump-sum payment received. On
the other hand, those HMOs that contract with hospitals and physicians on a
marginal or usage basis do not control the risk or shift the risk to a third party
such as physicians. In this fee-for-service system, the HMO compensates the
hospital or physician for each service rendered, and therefore, the HMO bears
the risk that the cost of the services that are paid for in a given period will be
greater than the amount of the premiums received in that given period.
Some, especially those in the health insurance industry, believe that the
Service's stand on this matter is erroneous.99 They assert that HMOs and
commercial health care insurers, like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, are in the same
business: financing health care via risk distribution and risk transfer, all
deriving revenue from premium income.1oo
Those in the health insurance industry believe the Service's contentions
regarding risk control are misdirected for two reasons. First, even if risk is
transferred to the physicians under a capitated contract, the HMO is still never
entirely relieved of the risk.101 Second, the control of risk applies only to the
physician expenses. Hospital facility expenses, however, which usually
account for approximately sixty percent of the total care expenses, are rarely
fixed. 102
HMOs do provide the service of financing health care. This function is one
of their stated purposes. To focus exclusively on this function, however, ignores
the progressive function of health care management; the arranging for,
organizing and managing of health care treatment in furtherance of the goal of
providing a more efficient health care system.
9 71d. Health insurance companies take on the risk that a group of insured individuals
will incur less medical costs than the premiums that the insured individuals paid.
Typically, little is done to control risk other than to charge higher premiums to those
expected to incur higher costs.
98 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10,1990).
99 See Tax Treatment under H.R. 3600, supra note 9.
1001d.
1011d.
0 2Id.
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V. TIE CURRENT LAW REGARDING TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR HMOs
A. The Sound Health Decision
The first major case in which the Service considered the tax exemption of an
HMO involved the Sound Health Association HMO (Sound Health).103 Shortly
after its incorporation, Sound Health applied to the Service for tax-exempt
status under § 501(c)(3) of the Code.104 In disallowing the exemption, the
Service took the position that private interests were being benefited rather than
public interests as is required under the Treasury Regulations implementing
§ 501(c)(3).105 Essentially, the Service argued that public interests were not
being served because the structure of the HMO primarily benefited only those
members of the community who were members of the HMO.106
Sound Health, after exhausting all of its administrative remedies, sought
review from the United States Tax Court.10 7 In Sound Health Association v.
Commissioner,08 the court held that Sound Health qualified as a charitable
organization under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. The court began its analysis by
recognizing that hospitals and the like are not specifically listed as tax-exempt
organizations, and therefore an HMO, like a hospital, must qualify as a
charitable organization to attain tax-exempt status.109 The court, relying on the
Eastern Kentucky decision, 110 looked to the law of charitable trusts and ruled
that the promotion of health within a community was a "charitable purpose."111
Thus, a medical institution that provides medical services could attain
charitable status, regardless of whether its services benefited the rich or
poor.112
103Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 159-66 (1978), modified by
Geisinger v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993). Sound Health HMO was
incorporated under the laws of Washington. It was organized as a not-for-profit
institution; therefore none of the profits it generated would inure to the benefit of any
member, director, officer or individual.
104Id.
1051d. at 168 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii)).
106The question of insurance provider versus health care provider was not an issue
in this litigation; thus, the Sound Health HMO passed the first tier of the Service's
two-tiered test. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10, 1990).
10771 T.C. at 177-86.
1081d. at 158.
1091d.
110See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (describing the Eastern Kentucky
litigation).
111Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 178-84.
112Id. at 177-78.
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With this rule of law in mind, the court looked to the services provided by
Sound Health. In so doing, the court reasoned that the qualifying criteria
applicable to hospitals should be applied to HMOs.11 3 Based on the services
that the HMO provided, the court concluded that the HMO was tantamount
to a hospital, as defined in the Treasury Regulations, u 4 and ruled that the
Sound Health HMO did provide medical services sufficient to qualify as a
charitable entity.n 5 Significant in the court's determination was the fact that
Sound Health provided a full range of medical services including an outpatient
clinic as well as a full-scale emergency room.116
Consistent with the law of charitable trusts, the court also recognized the
requirement that those benefited by the "promotion of health" should be of a
"sufficiently large or indefinite" class so as to constitute a community.117 The
court found this requirement consistent with the requirements under the
Treasury Regulations pertaining to § 501(c)(3). Under the Treasury
Regulations, n 8 the Service indicates that an exempt organization under
§ 501(c)(3) must be organized and operated for public rather than private
interests. Thus, at issue was whether the HMO's membership policy created a
group of persons large enough to be considered a community for purposes of
a charitable trust.
The court found that the group of persons served by the HMO was
sufficiently large to meet this requirement, even though, except in the case of
emergency room care, those served by the HMO had to be members.119 The
court reasoned that the number of people who could derive benefits from the
HMO was "practically unlimited" since the only barrier to joining the HMO
was the monetary fee for joining and retaining membership.1 20 The fee,
however, did not vary between individuals, and it varied only slightly between
individual and group membership.121 The court also considered the fact that
1131d. at 178-79.
114 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(1)(ii) (1972).
11571 T.C. at 179.
1161d. at 184.
117Id. at 181.
118See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1959).
11971 T.C. at 185. Following this decision, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 83-157.
Pursuant to this ruling, the lack of an emergency room does not preclude exemption if
such services are duplicative within the community. Based on the reasoning set forth in
this Revenue Ruling, if Sound Health's emergency room had been duplicative within
the community, then, arguably, the emergency room would not be a necessary element
to attain tax exemption. See 1983-2 C.B. 94.
12071 T.C. at 185.
121Group memberships received a discount on the initial membership fee, but the
monthly fees between individual memberships and group membership did not vary.
This difference in price resulted primarily from processing fees. 71 T.C. at 169 n. 3.
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Sound Health maintained a subsidized membership program. This program,
supported by charitable contributions, 122 gave members of the community
who were unable to pay an opportunity to join the HMO at a reduced or
minimal charge. 123 The court further found that public interests were being
served because the HMO had a nondiscriminatory hiring policy whereby all
qualified physicians were welcome to join the staff.124 Thus, even though
Sound Health only serviced its members,12 5 Sound Health sufficiently
demonstrated that public rather than private interests were being served by its
open membership policy. 126
B. The Geisinger Decision
The Service's latest attempt to limit the tax exemption given to HMOs
involved the Geisinger Health Plan (hereinafter GHP). GHP is an HMO
incorporated under both state and federal law and was part of a larger health
122See I.R.C. § 170 (1995). An organization that qualifies as a charitable organization
under § 501 (c)(3) may accept contributions that are tax-deductible contributions.
123Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 184.
124A nondiscriminatory hiring policy is significant when weighing public versus
private interests. The essence of the prohibition on benefiting private interests is the fear
that private shareholders or founders of the organization are the ones being benefited
rather than the public or the portion of the public whom the institution is organized to
benefit. For example, some hospitals or HMOs may be established, managed, operated,
and serviced exclusively by a small group of doctors. Such institutions would fail the
tax-exempt requirements when the "interests of charity are sacrificed to the private
interests of the founder[s] or [shareholders]," even though the institution may be
operated like any other tax-exempt hospital. See Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 186 (quoting
ExEMPT ORcANIzATIONS HANDBOOK (3 I.R.M. 7751), Part VII, 382.1(2)).
1251n addition to servicing its members, Sound Health also serviced nonmembers in
its emergency room. Sound Health notified a local ambulance company to bring all
emergency patients to the HMO emergency clinic regardless of membership. See 71 T.C.
at 184.
126 The court further reasoned that "[tihe main difference between [Sound Health and
an exempt hospital] is the time when they [and HMO or hospital] obligate themselves
to provide health care services." 71 T.C. at 187. The hospital has the opportunity, except
in the emergency situation, to wait until a person needs medical treatment before the
decision is made regarding whether the person will be treated. Id. An HMO, however,
must make a determination regarding whom it is going to treat at the time of
membership rather than when an individual becomes ill. Id. Both the decision of the
hospital and the HMO regarding who will be treated are financial decisions based on
who can pay the service fee. Id. In either situation, however, the indigent emergency
patient will not be denied service. 71 T.C. at 187. See also Levine, supra note 10, at 98.
Both hospitals and HMOs serve to promote the health of a community but differ only
regarding when payment is made. With HMOs, payment is made in the form of a
subscriber fee, but with hospitals, payment is made following the performance of
services. Ultimately, this should have no significance in determining community
benefit.
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care network called the Geisinger System.127 The Geisinger System was a
parent system that consisted of eight other health care entities, all of which were
tax-exempt.128 In 1987, consistent with the status of each constituent member
in the system, GHP petitioned the Service for exempt status as a charitable
organization under § 501(c)(3). 129
The Service, relying on the ruling set forth in Sound Health,13 0 denied GHP's
request on the grounds that GHP did not meet all of the elements set forth in
Sound Health.131 Particularly, the Service relied on the fact that GHP was not
organized as a health care provider.132 Instead, GHP contracted with groups
of physicians and other hospitals within the larger Geisinger System to provide
health services to its members. 133 The HMO contracted with physicians to
provide these services and compensated the physicians based on a flat monthly
fee. 134 The hospitals with which the HMO contracted were compensated on a
per diem basis for inpatient services, while the outpatient services were
charged to the HMO at a discounted rate.135
In an attempt to challenge the Service's decision, GHP sought a declaratory
judgment from the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court, in Geisinger Health
Plan v. Commissioner,13 6 overturned the Service's ruling and held that GHP
qualified as a charitable organization under § 501(c)(3). 13 7 The court
concluded, as a factual matter, that GHP was organized and operated for the
purpose of promoting the health of the community.138 Additionally, the court
found that the group of persons benefited by GHP was sufficient to constitute
a community.139
In reaching these conclusions, the court relied on the Treasury
Regulations, 140 which require tax-exempt organizations to be organized and
127Geisinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-649,62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656, rev'd, 985
F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
12 81d. at 1656-60.
1 2 91d.
13071 T.C. at 158.
131Geisinger, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1656-60.
1321d.
1 33 1d.
134 d.
13 5Geisinger, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1656-60.
1361d. at 1664.
13 71d. at 1661-64.
138[d.
13 9 Geisinger, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1662-64.
140Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (a) (1959).
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operated exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose. As was mentioned, GHIP's
stated tax-exempt purpose was the promotion of health of the community, a
charitable purpose under the common law of trusts and under the Eastern
Kentucky decision.14 1 To meet the requirement that an entity be organized and
operated for a tax-exempt purpose, the Treasury Regulations require an entity
to engage primarily in activities that serve its exempt purpose. 142 Aware of this
requirement, the Tax Court chose to focus on GH1's exempt purpose rather
than the nature of the activities in which GHP engaged. 143 Because GHP
promoted the health of the community, its stated purpose, the court concluded
that the issue of how it promoted the health of the community was of no
significance. Therefore, GHP qualified for exemption even though GHP's
primary activity was arranging for health care rather than actually providing
hands-on health care.144
Also at issue was whether the group of persons benefited by GHP was large
enough to constitute a community. Because the Treasury Regulations 145 require
that public rather than private interests be served, the Service argued that, by
arranging for the health care of only its members, GHP served private interests
rather than public interests.146 The Tax Court, relying on the Sound Health
decision, concluded that GHP did serve a sufficiently large class of the
community to pass the public/private test.147 Similar to the reasoning in Sound
Health, the Tax Court considering GHP's status reasoned that the lack of
significant barriers to membership indicated that the entire community was
"eligible" to benefit from GHP through membership.14 8 Furthermore, the court
considered the fact that GHP had a subsidized membership program, which
served to allow membership to those who would otherwise be financially
unable to join.149
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the appellate court overturned the Tax
Court's decision holding that "GHP does not qualify for tax-exempt status ...
14 1See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the law of charitable trusts).
142Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1959).
14 3 Geisinger, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1660.
1441d. at 1662-64.
145§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii) (1959).
146Geisinger, 62 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1662-63.
14 7 1d. at 1662.
1481d.
1491d. The number of people actually admitted by G-P under the subsidized dues
program was thirty-five. Geisinger, 62 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1660. GHP claimed that the
subsidized dues program would assist a more significant number of people once
financing for the program matured. /d. Moreover, GHP maintained that the success of
this program hinged on whether GHP qualified for exempt status, thereby enabling it
to receive § 170 contributions (recall that the ability to receive tax-deductible
contributions is a benefit of the § 501(c)(3) status). Id.
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since it does no more than arrange for... health care services."150 Furthermore,
the fact that GHP arranged for the medical care of only its members indicated
that it failed to serve a charitable purpose, especially where few members were
admitted under the subsidized membership program.151
The Third Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that GHP was not a
hospital. The court maintained, however, that hospital precedent was
applicable since GHP's stated purpose was the promotion of health.152
Subsequently, based on its understanding of the law of tax-exempt hospitals,
the court concluded that the applicable test was whether GHP "primarily
benefited the community."153
Relying on this test, the court concluded that the Sound Health court
misapplied the law in reasoning that a public interest was served by the fact
that the entire community was "eligible" to become a member.154 The Geisinger
court opined that GHP's membership program served to primarily benefit
itself, only "secondarily benefiting the community."155
The Geisinger court, however, did not overrule the decision set forth in Sound
Health. Rather, it modified the ruling by holding that the Sound Health HMO
provided "additional indicia of a charitable purpose," thereby allowing it to
qualify under § 501(c)(3).156 Such "additional indicia of a charitable purpose"
included Sound Health's full-scale emergency room and outpatient clinic
which were open to the entire community.157
With regard to GHP's subsidized membership program, the court
discredited it as offering no additional indicia of a charitable purpose.158 The
court particularly noted that GHP had only thirty-five subsidized members as
opposed to the nearly seventy thousand paying members.159
15OGeisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210,1220 (3d Cir. 1993).
15 1 d.
152M. at 1216.
153 d. at 1217.
154985 F.2d at 1218.
155 d. at 1219.
156Id. at 1217-20.
15 71d. at 1218.
158985 F.2d at 1220.
15 9 d. GHP argued that Sound Health had subsidized its program only $158.50 at the
time it was granted tax exemption. Id. The court, however, opined that Sound Health
had benefited the community in other ways via the emergency room and outpatient
clinic. Id.
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VI. GEISINGER'S EFFECT ON HMOs SEEKING EXEMPTION
Congress has contemplated codifying standards that would delineate
HMOs based on their organizational structures and operation.160 Under such
a statute, each HMO would be classified and its classification would affect its
ability to gain tax exemption. 161 The rule of law as set forth in Geisinger would
serve as the basis for determining whether HMOs can be charitable
organizations pursuant to § 501(c)(3). 162 Exemption as a charitable
organization would require satisfying the community benefit standard,
establishing that the HMO serves public rather than private interests, and
assuring that net income does not inure to the benefit of any individual or
private shareholder. 163 Congress has also contemplated codifying the
standards an HMO must meet to gain exemption under § 501(c)(4). 164 One
commentator has suggested that this standard would involve a community
benefit standard that is less demanding than the community benefit standard
for § 501(c)(3) organizations. 165 Health insurance companies, of which Blue
Cross/Blue Shield is a prototypical example, would continue to be precluded
from § 501(a) exemption pursuant to § 501(m)(3).166
Since Congress began considering health care reform, much debate has
surrounded the issue of tax exemption for HMOs. Advocates at one end of the
debate, especially those in the health insurance industry, have argued that all
HMOs should be precluded from tax exemption.167 Their arguments are
grounded on the premise that HMOs simply offer a form of health insurance
and, therefore, they should be treated like other health insurers.168 At the other
end of the debate, advocates have argued that a strong tax-exempt health care
system is vital to maintaining a quality health care system. 169 As one
1 6 0 See Health Security Act Description, supra note 25.
161See Neal & Papiewski, supra note 11, at 585.
1 6 2 See Gourevitch, supra note 22, at 1320.
1 6 3 5ee supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's
decision in Geisinger); see also supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (discussing the
standard that the Service has adopted for considering an HMO's exemption).
164See Gourevitch, supra note 22, at 1319.
1 6 51d.
1661d. at 1321; Blue Cross/Blue Shield Organizations are generally taxed in the same
manner that property and casualty insurance companies are taxed, but are "entitled to
a special income tax deduction ... enabling them to take a tax deduction, for regular tax
but not alternative minimum tax purposes, equal to 25 percent of claims and expenses
for the taxable year reduced by the adjusted surplus at the beginning of the year." Id.;
see also I.R.C. § 833 (1995).
167See Testimony of Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra note 11.
1681d.
16 9 See Boisture, supra note 82.
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commentator has suggested, in a nonprofit health care system, "patients'
interests, not profits are paramount."170
Current statutory proposals strike a compromise between the opposite ends
of the debate, allowing exemption to some HMOs as § 501(c)(3) organizations,
and to others as § 501(c)(4) organizations. Similarly, the holding in Geisinger
falls midway between the opposing views in the debate, allowing tax
exemption as charitable organizations to those HMOs that look most like
hospitals.
Because any legislation ultimately passed by Congress will have a significant
impact on the future of HMOs, a closer look at the reasoning supporting the
current proposals is warranted. The Geisinger decision currently represents the
Service's and the Clinton Administration's standard for considering the status
of HMOs as charitable organizations. Congress, prior to codifying this rule of
law, should consider the reasoning on which this rule of law is based.
Particularly, should HMOs be compared to hospitals when considering their
status as charitable organizations pursuant to § 501(c)(3)? Also, does the
community benefit standard, as set forth in Geisinger, make sense?
The Third Circuit in Geisinger based its conclusion on two factors. First, GHP
was primarily benefiting itself since only members could obtain its services.
Second, GIP lacked any indicia of a charitable purpose, such as the operation
of an emergency room open to the public or some type of outpatient service.
These reasons appear to have been guided by two themes. First, the Third
Circuit seemed to be swayed significantly by the fact that GHP was not a
hospital or similar institution. GHP was simply a health care manager,
arranging for the health services of its members through a managed system.
The weight given to this fact is evident in the court's concluding statement that
"GHP does not qualify.., since it does no more than arrange for... health
care."171 In fact, this reasoning pervaded the opinion, in that the court began
its analysis by applying precedent that had related exclusively to the question
of tax exemption for hospitals. The fatal impact that this line of reasoning had
on GIP's tax exemption manifests itself in the court's observation that GHP
lacked an "outpatient service" or simply failed to provide "free care." 172 Both
of these criteria are applicable exclusively to institutions that provide hands-on
health care treatment. Since GHP was not organized and operated to provide
hands-on health care treatment, it was precluded from attaining § 501(c)(3)
status once the court began this reasoning. Although HMOs have traditionally
been thought of as hybrid hospital-health insurers, they are not exclusively
organized and operated in this manner. The impact that Geisinger will have on
HMOs, therefore, is significant since those not resembling hospitals will be
precluded from attaining § 501(c)(3) status.
17 0 d. at 785.
171Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1220.
172Id.
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Second, the court created and applied what appears to be a new community
benefit standard. The court ruled that an institution will qualify as a tax-exempt
entity if it "primarily benefits the community."173 This test, however, is clearly
distinguishable from the requirements of the Treasury Regulations. The
Treasury Regulations require tax-exempt organizations to operate by
"engag[ing] primarily in activities which accomplish" a charitable purpose, and
this charitable purpose must serve "a public rather than a private interest."174
The court's application of this "primarily benefits" test proved fatal to GHP's
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. This is not surprising, however, since the
requirement that an organization primarily benefit the community is almost
insurmountable. 175 In fact, if such a test were applied to all § 501(c)(3)
organizations, there would be few tax-exempt organizations left.1 76 For
example, churches and related religious organizations are operated to
primarily benefit their members, although the entire community could be
eligible for membership. Likewise, educational institutions operate primarily
for the benefit of their own students. Educational institutions are also similar
to hospitals in that students attending educational institutions pay for the
service of education directly or indirectly through some third party payment
system such as grants, scholarships or loans. Bottom line: charities primarily
benefit the poor; scientific organizations seeking cures for diseases primarily
benefit people with those diseases; organizations to prevent cruelty to children
or animals primarily benefit children and animals; and hospitals operate
primarily to benefit patients who pay for services, either directly or indirectly
through some third party payment system such as private insurance, Medicare
or Medicaid.
All the institutions mentioned above are tax-exempt because they are
organized and operated to engage primarily in activities to further their exempt
purpose and to serve public rather than private interests. They do not, however,
operate to primarily benefit the community. Arguably, the govemment, armed
forces, law enforcement, and similar institutions are the only organizations that
are organized and operated to primarily benefit the community.
Thus, Geisinger seems to be grounded on somewhat shaky ground.
Nonetheless, the court may have arrived at the right decision. The decision in
Geisinger was directed to the charitable status of HMOs and their tax exemption
1731d. at 1217.
174See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.501(c) & (d)(1)(ii) (1959).
175The court in Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 185, made a similar argument:
If any "preferential treatment" is given to Association members, then
it is the preferential treatment common to every charitable organization
that benefits the community by benefiting a certain class of individuals.
To our knowledge, no charity has ever succeeded in benefiting every
member of the community. If to fail to so benefit everyone renders an
organization noncharitable, then dire times must lie ahead for this
nation's charities.
1 7 61d.
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under this status. The case was not, however, determinative of the general
question of exemption for HMOs under § 501(a). Thus, although an HMO may
not meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3) status, exemption as a social welfare
organization pursuant to § 501(c)(4) is still a possibility.177
An organization qualifying as a social welfare organization under § 501(c)(4)
obtains the same freedom from federal taxation under § 501(a) as a charitable
organization qualifying under § 501(c)(3). The major shortcoming of § 501(c)(4)
status, however, is the inability to obtain tax-free bond financing. The inability
to obtain tax-free bond financing may be significant to HMOs needing to
expand their medical facilities as demand for health services increases, but
HMOs that do not maintain medical facilities (such as IPA and network model
HMOs) should not be affected by this shortcoming. The hospitals or staff model
HMOs with which the IPA or network model HMOs contract for services will
be able to obtain § 501(c)(3) status under the current law of Geisinger. Thus, if
Congress decides that HMOs are worthy of tax exemption under § 501(c)(4),
the decision in Geisinger should not have a major impact on those HMOs unable
to gain § 501(c)(3) exemption status.
VII. THE NEXT DEBATE: EXEMPTION AS A SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION
Many HMOs have taken advantage of the § 501(c)(4) status and many others
are sure to follow, especially in the wake of the Geisinger decision. 178 This trend
will inevitably lead to a debate over whether HMOs deserve to be exempt as
social welfare organizations. Rather than argue the similarities and differences
beteen HMOs and hospitals, this debate will most likely center around the
differences and similarities between HMOs and insurance companies.
Those in the health insurance industry have argued that any exemption for
HMOs will result in treating similarly situated taxpayers differently.179 Such
arguments are grounded on the contention that the services provided by
HMOs, especially IPA and network model HMOs, are tantamount to the
services provided by the insurance industry18 0
The Service's current position is that HMOs transfer risk to the primary
care physicians and, therefore, are distinguishable from health insurance
177See T.J. Sullivan, The Tax Status of Nonprofit HMOs After Section 501(m), 50 TAX
NOTES 75,80 (1991)(indicating that the Service's position requires HMOs seeking social
welfare status to meet a community benefit standard, one that is less exacting than the
standard for charitable status); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,829 (Aug. 24, 1990). The
impact that the Geisinger decision will have on the application and interpretation of this
standard is not presently clear. See Gourevitch, supra note 22, at 1319.
1781n 1992, only 32.5 percent of all HMOs were exempt as either charitable or social
welfare organizations. Robert A. Boisture, Assessing the Impact of Health Care Reform on
the Formation of Tax-Exempt Health Care Providers and HMOs, 9 ExEMr ORG. TAX REV.
271,283 (1994).
179See Testimony of Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra note 11.
1 8 0 Id.
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providers. 81 Advocates for the health insurance industry, however, argue that
the Service's position is misdirected on two counts. First, insurance advocates
contend that HMOs are never fully relieved of risk "unless the insured relieves
the insurer of risk."182 Second, such advocates contend that any risks that may
be transferred are simply physician benefits, and non-physician benefits, which
comprise a majority of the cost, are not transferred. 183
The Code at § 501(m)(3) indicates that "incidental health insurance provided
by a health maintenance organization" is not considered commercial-type
insurance for purposes of § 501(m). Pursuant to § 501(m), an organization, "a
substantial part of [whose] activities consists of providing commercial-type
insurance," is precluded from exemption under § 501. Without a more precise
rule by Congress, the issue of whether IPA or network model HMOs provide
incidental health insurance will inevitably come before the courts. Similar to
the situation in Geisinger, a court will be forced to make a policy decision
regarding whether IPA or network model HMOs are worthy of exemption. At
the center of the debate will be the issue of whether HMOs are or are not health
insurance companies. This debate, like the debate over whether HMOs are or
are not hospitals, could continue indefinitely. Thus, it is incumbent upon
Congress to decide whether managed care is worthy of exemption. This
decision should not be made based on the comparability of hospitals to HMOs
or the comparability of health insurance companies to HMOs, but rather the
decision should be based on whether tax-exempt HMOs are needed and
whether they provide a benefit to our health care system, thereby promoting
the health of the community.
The question of whether managed health care systems should be exempt is
worthy of direct consideration for several reasons. As our society continually
attempts to reform the overall health care system, it is quite clear that health
care management, financing, and organization play as important a role as the
provision of health care treatment itself. Managed care is not a service that
hospitals have traditionally provided and often does not involve hands-on
medical treatment. Instead, managed health care is simply a means of
controlling the inflationary effects of a pay-for-service system of health care.
Although managed health care can assume a variety of structures and
operational formats, institutions that provide health care management
essentially organize, finance and manage health care delivery in a manner
which maximizes efficiency and minimizes cost. The question of whether
organizations providing this service should be tax-exempt has never been
addressed in this light.
181 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 10, 1990).
182 See Testimony of Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra note 11.
1831d.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Managed health care organizations will play an important role in this
country's health care reform. These organizations offer advantages over the
current pay-for-service system, including the ability to control costs.
Exemption from federal income taxation has historically been an option for
hospitals, economically affecting the operation and survival of many hospitals.
Tax exemption could also play a vital role in the proliferation, financing and
operation of many HMOs.
The recent decision in Geisinger has narrowed the opportunity for many
HMOs to gain exemption as charitable organizations. Although the reasoning
of the Geisinger court can be debated, the decision appears to have resulted in
a logical approach to the question of tax exemption for HMOs. Those HMOs
that operate full-scale medical facilities and employ large medical staffs can
gain exemption as charitable organizations and reap the derivative benefits of
this status in order to maintain and grow their medical staffs and facilities.
HMOs that do not operate full-scale medical facilities should still be permitted
to gain exemption as social welfare organizations, a status that does not carry
the derivative benefits of charitable status. An HMO not operating a medical
facility, however, probably does not need the derivative benefits of the
charitable status.
The question of exemption for HMOs will continually be debated as those
in the health care industry compete for market share and seek identical tax
treatment. While Congress is currently considering codifying the holding of
Geisinger, legislators should directly consider the reasons why HMOs should
or should not be taxed. Such a forthright debate would serve to delineate the
requirements for charitable status and the requirements for social welfare
status. In doing so, Congress should consider whether managed health care
systems offer any benefit to the community by strengthening the health care
system. This is clearly a policy question that should be left to the legislature.
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